



























































From principles to practice in paying for nature’s services 
By S. Wunder*, R. Brouwer, S. Engel, D. Ezzine-de-Blas, R. Muradian, U. Pascual, R. Pinto 
Abstract  
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) 
constitute an innovative economic intervention 
to counteract the global loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem functions. In theory, some appealing 
features should enable PES to perform well in 
achieving conservation and welfare goals. In 
practice, outcomes depend on the interplay be-
tween context, design, and implementation. In-
specting a new global dataset, we find that some 
PES design principles pre-identified in the so-
cial science literature as desirable, such as spa-
tial targeting and payment differentiation, are 
only partially being applied in practice. More 
importantly, the PES-defining principle of con-
ditionality – monitoring compliance and sanc-
tioning detected non-compliance – is seldom 
being implemented. Administrative ease, multi-
ple non-environmental side objectives, and so-
cial equity concerns may jointly help explain the 
reluctance to adopt more sophisticated, theoret-
ically informed practices. However, by taking 
simplifying shortcuts in design and implemen-
tation, PES programmes may become less envi-
ronmentally effective and efficient as economic 
incentives, thus underperforming their conser-
vation potential.     
The rationale for payments 
Continued environmental degradation calls 
globally for innovative policies to bridge real 
trade-offs between environmental and develop-
ment goals (1). PES arose from the hope to deal 
more consciously with such trade-offs in nature 
conservation and environmental governance, 
directly incentivizing landowners and other re-
source stewards to adopt environmentally 
friendly practices. Theoretically, PES feature a 
quid pro quo paradigm of conditionality: you 
only pay for what you get (2,3). They aim to en-
hance the additionality of environmental ser-
vices (ES) provided, i.e. better environmental 
outcomes compared to a business-as-usual 
baseline. In practice, additionality will depend 
on the interplay between context, design, and 
implementation. However, often environmental 
effectiveness is not the only policy objective of 
PES; frequently (implicit or explicit) other 
goals, especially related to human welfare and 
social equity, are at play (4-6).  
PES implementation has expanded quickly 
in the last two decades, and impact evaluation 
studies are emerging with first lessons (7-9). 
The potential for PES to be direct and perfor-
mance-based, yet flexible, negotiated and fair is 
promising (2,4,10), although trade-offs with 
poverty and equity goals (11-12), and among 
different environmental goals (13), have raised 
concerns. A poor biophysical science base 
might also render PES ineffective (14). Some-
times short-run payments can effectively induce 
change, e.g. subsidizing the adoption of sustain-
able technologies (15), yet often payments and 
financing structures have to be of a lasting na-
ture to ensure that environmentally desirable 
practices continue over the long term (16).   
A salient question pertains to the role of the 
social-science foundations of PES. In particular, 
to what extent do practitioners incorporate state-
of-the-art thinking into PES design and imple-
mentation for effective and efficient, yet equita-
ble outcomes? Without denying biophysical 
preconditions for PES (14), we argue that the so-
cial sciences play a vital role in this pre-assess-
ment. As economists debating PES functional-
ity, we will in the following discuss (i) 
preconditions for PES implementation and (ii) 
informed economic principles of PES design, 
followed by (iii) an empirical stocktaking of the 
degree to which these principles are de facto be-
ing implemented, including (iv) when looking at 
different targeted ES. In explaining our findings, 
we analyse the role of (v) transaction costs, and 
vi) equity considerations related to different de-
sign and (implementation practices. We con-
clude by discussing the implications for envi-
ronmental policies and strategies (vii). 
Preconditions for PES 
While PES programmes are conceived to bridge 
conflicts between ES users and providers over 
management of natural resources, perceiving 
PES as a silver bullet could easily misguide con-
servation investments (10-12). Decision makers 
should always evaluate the pertinence of PES 
vis-à-vis other available policy instruments. In 
our view, four preconditions should be checked 
(10, 17-18):  
(i) ES users’ willingness to pay likely ex-
ceeds ES providers’ willingness to accept com-
pensations. This is a fundamental economic re-
ality check for PES: does the user-perceived 
value of the ES exceed the value of landholders’ 
expected costs of ES delivery? Usually we 
know neither the precise value of the ES nor the 
precise cost of participation, but we can make 
informed guesses. 
(ii) ES users are capable of internally or-
ganizing payments. In other words, the ES user 
(or public) institutions are in place to champion 
the introduction and administration of PES.  
(iii) ES providers have sufficiently secure 
user rights over environmentally critical re-
sources to effectively exclude third-party intru-
sions. More specifically, landowners and re-
source stewards need to actually be in charge of 
the decision-making processes that will come to 
determine ES provision.  
(iv) Any pre-existing intrinsic motivations 
for good stewardship are not crowded out by ex-
trinsic PES incentives. In other words, payment 
on balance needs to motivate receiving provid-
ers to sustainably deliver more ES.  
 We should probably see the first precondi-
tion (i) as an economic sine qua non for PES 
(17,18): if ES supply costs exceed ES demand 
values, the very foundation for voluntary agree-
ments will be missing. If the answer to any of 
the other questions (ii)-(iv) is negative, PES im-
plementation might still be possible, if it is ena-
bled by supplementary actions, e.g. land tenure 
reform, contract negotiation, institutional capac-
ity building, or incentives customized to moti-
vations. But these actions typically take time 
and resources. Furthermore, this will also affect 
subsequent PES design choices (9), which we 
will now turn to.                
Desirable design features 
Informed design principles of conservation pol-
icy instruments emerge when theory and gradu-
ally emerging evidence are reiteratively being 
confronted. Yet, the conservation evidence 
base, other than for protected areas (the oldest 
policy tool), arguably lags behind in terms of 
scientifically rigorous impact evaluation, com-
pared to e.g. development, health, or education 
interventions (19). For PES, this is no different  *Correspondence to:  swunder@cgiar.org 
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(7, 20-21). Encouragingly though, the number 
of scientifically rigorous impact evaluation 
cases is expanding (8). Likewise, some design 
lessons can be drawn from comparing PES case 
studies (4), from cross-sectional meta-studies 
(5, 22-24), and from similar incentive-based 
mechanisms (25). Arguably, sufficient 
knowledge about key economic design and im-
plementation principles for PES has thus by 
now been gathered for laying out some key 
best-practice implementation guidelines, not 
only from a natural (14), but also from a social 
sciences perspective. One recent PES design 
synthesis (9) calls for contextually customized 
PES, related for example to contract duration 
and scale, number and type of intermediaries, 
and payment modes. But the empirical evi-
dence also points to three specific stylized de-
sign and implementation recommendations (4-
5, 9, 22-25): (i) spatial targeting, (ii) payment 
differentiation, and (iii) enforced conditional-
ity. 
First, ES densities (e.g. forest carbon 
stocks) and their leverage of change (e.g. defor-
estation threats) tend to distribute unevenly in 
space (26-28): some places matter far more 
than others for conservation. Budgets are usu-
ally too scarce to enrol all potential ES suppliers 
in a scheme. Thus, it pays off to spatially target 
high-ES density (27) and high-threat areas for 
PES enrolment (28). Combined they likely pro-
vide additional environmental benefits, com-
pared to e.g. a random selection of participants 
(27). In PES programmes where budget-wise 
only a small portion of applicant landholders 
can be enrolled, it may also be advisable to pre-
target low-cost providers, especially where 
costs of ES provision likely differ much (9, 18). 
Furthermore, threshold and other ecological in-
teraction effects may imply that spatial target-
ing needs also to enrol a minimum area size. 
For example, this can be achieved through spa-
tial contiguity targets and agglomeration bo-
nuses for collective provider enrolment (17, 
25). Finally, as exemplified by the history of the 
Mexican national hydrological PES pro-
gramme (PSAH) where up to a couple of doz-
ens of spatial selection criteria were at some 
point being used, an adaptive PES design can 
help securing an adequate balance between dif-
ferent targeting goals that are overlapping in 
space (28-30).     
Second, even among spatially carefully tar-
geted ES suppliers, socio-economic heteroge-
neities may still exist. Selected ES suppliers 
may differ not only in potential ES density, but 
also in their costs of provision. If participant 
characteristics can be used to infer these costs, 
it usually makes sense to differentiate payments 
from the cost side. For instance, landowners on 
high-value lands (e.g., with more fertile soils, or 
closer to agricultural markets) will likely forgo 
higher revenues for land set-asides, and may 
thus require and request higher compensations 
to cover their opportunity costs. Unless ES pro-
viders are generally homogenous, PES imple-
menters should vary payment offers according 
to proxies of provision costs and/or likely site-
specific environmental benefits (9).  
Finally, once participants have been selected 
and payment levels been set, conditionality is by 
design core to PES (31). We define conditional-
ity as the combination of compliance monitor-
ing (efforts to detect non-complying partici-
pants, typically combining remote-sensing 
technologies with on-site ground-truthing) and 
sanctions (penalties enforced on participants in 
response to revealed non-compliance). Yet, un-
less contract compliance is both credibly moni-
tored and enforced, contracted landowners may 
receive payments while continuing business as 
usual, i.e. profitably defecting on their contrac-
tual obligations (32). Monitored and enforced 
conditionality is necessary to make PES func-
tion as effective incentives for conservation 
(24).  
 
Design and implementation in practice 
To what extent are these key design principles 
then being adopted and implemented in reality? 
We created a new global dataset (cf. Methods 
section) where for all included cases, first, con-
ditional payments should de facto have been im-
plemented at least once (functional criterion). 
Secondly, included cases should have been de-
scribed at least once in the peer-reviewed litera-
ture, in ways that shed light on the design and 
implementation variables of our interest (analyt-
ical criterion). The resulting worldwide 70 PES 
programmes in our dataset constitute a sample 
of consolidated and well-described schemes that 
lend confidence in sufficient PES management 
experience and good quality data for their eval-
uation.   
We then coded design and implementation 
features from the case descriptions, and com-
bined these where relevant with own field-based 
case-specific observations. This allowed us to 
assess the real-world adoption of key best-prac-
tice features of PES for our sample.  
  First, as for spatial targeting, half of our 
cases (35) selected ES providers within prede-
fined intervention areas according to proxies for 
ES density (Fig.1). Some (e.g. the US Conser-
vation Reserve Programme or Mexico’s PSAH) 
used multidimensional ES targeting; for many 
others priorization is much simpler (e.g. one-tier 
targeting of primary over secondary forests). 
Predicted threat/leverage assessment was in turn 
used much less for spatial targeting (6 cases; 
9%). Almost one third of cases (19, or 31%) 
used neither ES densities nor threats for pre-se-
lection (i.e. no targeting), while only 10 (14%) 
used both targeting criteria simultaneously.     
 Secondly, diversified payments were used 
in over half of our cases (41; 59%), though no-
tably payments were more often differentiated 
by ES benefits than based on cost differences. 
Diversified payments are also generally more 
often applied in OECD countries (Fig.1), per-
haps due to greater ease there with market-like 
payment features (cf. Equity aspects section). 
Again, in extreme cases payments were fully 
customized to each ES provider’s productive 
condition (e.g. French Vittel watershed PES); in 
many others, just two PES rates apply, with a 
single premium being paid for particularly stra-
tegic areas (e.g. cloud forests or erosion-prone 
slopes).  
Finally, regarding conditionality, the good 
news is that all initiatives monitored compli-
ance: two thirds of them (63%) did so compre-
hensively; the rest to some extent. The bad news 
is that only one fourth of the initiatives (18; 
26%) had a consistent record of sanctioning 
non-compliance when detected, by reducing or 
discontinuing payments (Fig.1). The same share 
(26%) enforced rules partially, while almost half 
of the cases (48%) have allegedly never sanc-
tioned any participant. In principle, this could be 
because every contracted participant always 
complied. Yet, experiences in both OECD (24, 
33) and non-OECD countries (4, 24, 32, 34) 
show that over time the rules in PES will typi-
cally be tested by tentative defiance, as an eco-
nomically rational strategy. More likely than 
continuously perfect compliance is thus that 
PES implementers frequently tolerate some de-
gree of non-compliance (24, 32).   
 
Looking at different services 
One might expect PES practices to differ ac-
cording to which ES types the intervention is fo-
cused on. In Fig.2, we take a closer look. Ini-
tially, we observe some regions with high 
concentration of especially watershed PES: 
Mesoamerica, Northern Andes (cf. zoom-in 
maps), and Southeast Asia. In Africa, biodiver-
sity and carbon schemes, typically financed 
from abroad, are more common, while OECD 
countries often operate PES schemes with mul-
tiple ES being targeted.  
Turning to implementation practices, wa-
tershed and biodiversity focused PES tend to 
much more often be spatially targeted (cf. cir-
cles in Fig.2) than schemes featuring carbon or 
multiple ES, where spatial targeting tends to be 
lacking (cf. square symbols). As explained 
above, this could be due to either targeting to 
threats or to ES density. ES focus and threat tar-
geting is insignificantly correlated (Fisher’s Ex-


































































are in turn highly significantly correlated 
(Fisher’s Exact Test 21.94; α=0.001). This 
means that managers of watershed and biodi-
versity PES schemes are doing a particularly 
good job in the spatially targeting of  high ES 
density areas. Given the spatial specificity of 
these two ES, this practice makes good sense.  
For implemented conditionality, another 
key PES practice, we do not find any clear pat-
terns of correlation with ES focus, nor with any 
other of our database variables (funding, re-
gion, size, etc.). Larger circles/ squares in Fig.2 
show documented cases of well-enforced con-
ditionality, but their occurrence correlates to 
neither ES focus, spatial targeting practices, 
payment differentiation, nor region. Disaggre-
gating conditionality into monitoring and sanc-
tioning non-compliance also yields no further 
insights: both are insignificantly related to ES 
focus and to other key background variables.         
In summary, of our three pre-identified key 
strategic PES features to get economic incen-
tives right, we find implementers do reasonably 
well in targeting ecologically strategic areas 
(though rarely spatially predicting threats) and 
diversifying payments (though using as criteria 
much more the supplied ES densities than the 
costs of ES provision). Yet, two observed de-
sign features are noteworthy.  
First, the fact that less than one out of five 
PES schemes targets threats/ leverage is some-
what worrying: the landowners that would have 
complied anyhow with the PES requirements 
(i.e. zero threat/ leverage) have also zero costs 
of ES provision, so they will tend to apply first 
for entry into the PES programme, yet provide 
no environmental additionality. This phenome-
non, known as adverse self-selection of partici-
pants, is thus not being addressed proactively 
by PES implementers (21, 35).  
Secondly, only very few PES programmes 
actively use cost parameters, to either pre-target 
low-cost ES providers, or to differentiate pay-
ments according to alleged cost levels. This 
lack of attention to costs bodes not well for the 
prospects of achieving cost-effective outcomes 
from PES (9, 21, 25).   
Notably, however, our clearly most im-
portant finding relates to PES practices, rather 
than programme design. While most PES pro-
grams in our data set monitor contract compli-
ance reliably, only half of them have ever sanc-
tioned non-compliance, and only one fourth 
does so consistently. This crucial aspect of en-
vironmental governance has so far received lit-
tle attention in the PES debate.  
Applying all of our three essential design 
and implementation features in combination is 
much less common still: only two of our 70 
cases (Mexico’s PSAH and Monarch Butterfly 
Reserve programmes, respectively) used all 
three sophisticated features simultaneously.  
Our findings thus point to two simple, yet 
so far widely overlooked observations. First, 
PES design could generally be improved espe-
cially with respect to threat targeting and cost-
efficiency, dealing better with spatial heteroge-
neities. Secondly, the defining implementation 
feature of conditional compliance is being mon-
itored, but predominantly weakly, if at all, en-
forced by PES implementers. More often than 
not, it seems that PES implementers pay no mat-
ter what they get.  
 
Transaction costs  
The reality of PES design and implementation 
currently does thus not fully incorporate  the les-
sons from both PES theory and stylized experi-
ences. Why are practices seemingly lagging be-
hind the principles established in the literature? 
One initial reason might be that sophisticated 
design (such as payment differentiation and spa-
tial targeting) and demanding implementation 
(such as compliance monitoring and sanction-
ing) are too costly to effectuate: any efficiency 
gains from higher returns for every extra cent 
spent on payments could thus, so goes the argu-
ment, be outweighed by efficiency losses stem-
ming from incremental transaction costs (36).  
 At the current stage of knowledge, we have 
neither conclusive evidence nor strong indica-
tions that high incremental transaction costs 
would be key in explaining why advanced de-
sign techniques are being under-adopted. For in-
stance, in Costa Rica’s national PES pro-
gramme basic spatial targeting would reportedly 
only increase administrative costs by 3.8%, and 
total costs by 0.3%, while boosting ES benefits 
by at least 14% (27). For the UK, potential bio-
diversity benefits from improved spatial target-
ing and payment differentiation were found to 
be so high that even an increase in implementa-
tion costs by 70% would still be worthwhile: ef-
ficiency gains clearly outweigh added transac-
tion costs (37). Even when detailed spatial ES 
data do not pre-exist, cheaply accessible proxies 
might be generated to guide the targeting pro-
cess (26).  
On the cost side, heterogeneous ES provi-
sion costs may be hard for PES implementers to 
handle, due to asymmetric information about 
them (18). Procurement auctions among poten-
tial ES providers may be highly effective in re-
vealing provider costs, but are also potentially 
complex and expensive to organize (38). Still, 
small-scale auctions could be used first as a re-
search tool, to then guide the subsequent selec-
tion of proxies for price differentiation at larger 
scales of implementation. In our PES sample, 
only ten cases used auctions as a participant se-
lection and cost-informing tool. In turn, 31 cases 
differentiated payments by using simple prox-
ies, with probably lower transaction costs, but 
also less precise estimations of the costs of ES 
provision. 
Finally, monitoring and enforcement tend 
to be costly when requiring extensive field pres-
ence, and/ or acquisition of high-resolution re-
mote-sensing data. Type of threats also matter: 
deforestation, for instance, is easier and typi-
cally cheaper to monitor than forest degradation 
from timber extraction. Similar to enforcement 
measures in command-and-control policies 
(39), PES implementers need to set the size of 
sanctions and levels of costly monitoring and 
enforcement in ways that accommodate their 
customized mixes of objectives (40). While we 
believe monitoring in particular can be costly, 
and thus be subjected to budget constraints, the 
real bottleneck for enforced conditionality was 
sanctioning, which per se is less costly. It thus 
seems unlikely that transaction costs would be 
crucial in explaining why conditionality in PES 
is so ill-enforced.             
   
Equity aspects 
Transaction costs aside, a second potential mo-
tive for the reluctance to adopt improved design 
features deserves our attention: social equity and 
other human welfare-related goals of PES, such 
as poverty alleviation. The question whether or 
not to differentiate payments, and if so by what 
criterion, may illustrate the link between PES 
design and two different dimensions of equity: 
procedural and distributional equity (11).  
 First, procedural equity is achieved by ade-
quately active participation of ES providers in 
negotiating payments. Auctions, for instance, 
score particularly high in terms of integrating 
landowner information and perspectives into 
payment-setting procedures, if participants re-
ceive adequately contextualized information. 
They are thus procedurally more equitable than 
top-down determined payment schemes (41, 
42).       
Second, distributional equity refers to how 
payments are allocated across ES providers 
(43). PES implementers may often be inspired 
by the principle of horizontal equity, i.e. that (as-
sumedly) equal landowners should be treated 
alike (44). Uniform payments (flat rates per hec-
tare, household, or community) would thus be 
perceived to be more equitable than differenti-
ated payments. Nevertheless, from the opposite 
perspective of vertical equity – that unequal 
landowners need customized treatment (44) — 
payments should be aligned with differential ES 
provision cost among participants. Considering 
equity in the final payoffs to providers (i.e. pay-
ments minus cost of ES provision), high-cost 
providers should thus be paid more than low-


































































Yet, if poverty alleviation is a declared 
PES side objective, participants with lower in-
comes/ wealth should be pre-targeted as recipi-
ents and/ or receive higher unit payments, fol-
lowing a (maxi-min) principle of vertical equity 
(43). But favouring pro-poor redistribution may 
often not coincide with the above described 
cost-sharing criterion: poor ES providers often 
inhabit remotely located areas with lower aver-
age costs of ES provision. If the poorest are also 
low-cost ES providers, then cost-differentiated 
payments would have less of a redistributive ef-
fect than uniform payments.  
On aggregate, navigating efficiency and 
equity trade-offs in the face of contextual fair-
ness principles can lead to some hard choices 
for PES design (42-43). But multiple fairness 
principles underlying variable perceptions of 
vertical equity may also conduct us towards 
contradictory conclusions about which types of 
PES design are to be ranked as being more eq-
uitable. Given such complexity, and the politi-
cal need for negotiation among different actors, 
especially public-sector PES implementers will 
often opt for the simpler solution of uniform 
payments (4). Horizontal equity perceptions 
(‘all ES providers should receive the same pay-
ment’) can conveniently justify this choice of 
administrative simplicity, even when ES provi-
sion cost in fact differ greatly.                 
 
Discussion 
PES programmes differ in their priorities and 
goals, which necessarily will trigger some dif-
ferences in design and implementation: it is not 
our purpose here to make normative prescrip-
tions. However, we allege from our state-of-
the-art assessment that PES implementers often 
may come to take the wrong practical shortcuts, 
and oversimplify the functionality of the inno-
vative instrument they had set out to test (9). 
Deficiencies in the way PES are designed and 
implemented, so we argue, may thus help ex-
plain why PES performance in nascent impact 
evaluation studies arguably lags behind high 
expectations (7-8, 20-21). 
Why, then, does enforcement in particular 
come out in our analysis as the key bottleneck 
for adequate PES implementation? Less than a 
matter of problems with complex biophysical 
monitoring (14) or prohibitive transaction costs 
(36), we believe enforcement is often a politi-
cally sensitive question. In conservation, the 
observed frequency to sanction, and the size of 
the penalties, may vary with factors such as 
agents’ level of information, incidence of cor-
ruption, and the monetary and social costs of 
applying sanctions (45). PES implementers 
may fear the potential political costs associated 
with effective sanctioning systems, such as the 
administrative complexity of sanctions, possible 
inequity allegations if non-compliant ES pro-
viders are also poor, and erosion of incremen-
tally-built trust (46). 
 Notably, most PES, especially the (area-
wise often larger) public schemes, fulfil multi-
ple side-objectives (4). Tolerating non-compli-
ance may often dovetail well with recipient wel-
fare, developmental, and electoral motives for 
transferring PES rents to favoured beneficiaries: 
what is denominated as side-objectives may de 
facto come to overshadow the allegedly prime 
environmental goals of PES, and may have been 
the dominant motive in the political economy 
scenario that initially had led to PES adoption 
(47). 
Globally, we foresee mounting future de-
mands to use scarce conservation finance more 
efficiently. If new environmental impact assess-
ments continue to reveal inefficiencies in PES 
design and implementation, political pressures 
may eventually mount for more transparent and 
economically informed policy choices. This 
may hopefully also set the stage for better real-
izing the potential of PES to achieve efficient 
and equitable conservation impacts.     
 
Methods 
We started from the assumption that a broad-
ened empirical base was needed to shed further 
light on the PES design and implementation 
questions at hand. We thus created a merged 
global dataset, by combining three pre-existing 
datasets of PES cases that had been compiled 
through independent efforts in the years 2011, 
2015, and 2016, respectively. More specifically,  
we complemented one previous systematic PES 
literature review (24) with suitable cases from 
two additional co-author contributed databases: 
one global-comparative watershed PES study 
(5), a category arguably somewhat underrepre-
sented in (24), and one meta-study on biophysi-
cal PES aspects (14) that is stronger than (24) in 
representing biodiversity-related cases.  
For inclusion in our dataset, we maintained 
from (24) a narrow definition of PES as: “vol-
untary transactions between service users and 
service providers that are conditional on agreed 
rules of natural resource management for gener-
ating offsite services” (3).  This ensured that all 
included initiatives were truly comparable in 
function, i.e. the manner in which land and re-
source uses are being influenced by the inter-
vention is similar. This functional compatibility 
should be warranted even though the pro-
grammes at hand featured the provision of dif-
ferent (baskets of) ES.  
Beyond function, however, we also set min-
imum data requirements for cases to be in-
cluded: basic descriptors for assessing PES de-
sign and implementation were needed, such as 
regarding criteria for PES participation (spatial 
and other targeting rules), payment modalities 
and amounts, as well as compliance monitoring 
and the sanctioning of non-compliance. The 
number of well-researched and documented 
case studies was smaller than we had initially 
hoped for. We added 12 cases drawing on the 
unpublished primary data from (5). For those 
cases, we had to search for additional literature 
to complete our set of minimum descriptors. In 
the same vein, from the database in (14), we 
were only able to add three additional cases: the 
remainder either had insufficient information 
about social-science aspects, or proved to be 
proposed PES schemes (e.g. in project docu-
ments) where payments had actually never 
come to take place.     
Hence, while we believe many more real-
world PES schemes than in our sample likely 
fulfil our functional criteria, not many cases in 
the literature described sufficiently our targeted 
features of design (degree of payment differen-
tiation and spatial targeting) and implementa-
tion (type of monitoring and sanctions applied): 
the analytical criteria proved to be fairly restric-
tive.  
Applying these filters and eliminating over-
lap between the original three databases, re-
sulted in 70 distinct PES cases in our merged 
global dataset. Geographically, North and South 
America dominate (18 initiatives, respectively), 
followed by Asia (14), Africa (13), Europe (6), 
and Australia (1), with the majority of schemes 
(77%) being located in non-OECD countries. 
Over one third of the cases (27) started imple-
mentation before the year 2000, with an accel-
eration in the number of implemented cases 
hereafter. Most of the 70 PES schemes targeted 
terrestrial ecosystems (36), followed by 
schemes focusing on land-water interactions 
(32), while two targeted marine ecosystems. 
The average PES size is 770 ha, but varies 
vastly, from micro-watershed initiatives of less 
than 50 hectares to multi-million hectare pro-
grammes such as the US Conservation Reserve 
Programme or the Chinese Sloping Land Con-
version Programme. Most of the schemes tar-
geted watershed ES (31), followed by biodiver-
sity conservation (19), multiple agricultural ES 
(12), and climate change mitigation (8). 39 ini-
tiatives are publicly funded, 29 privately, while 
two programmes have mixed financing sources. 
Just over half of the cases (36) feature local ben-
eficiaries, 20 percent (14 schemes) national and 
29 percent (20 cases) have international benefi-
ciaries. 
It was important for our analysis to capture 
the degree of sophistication in certain parame-
ters of essential PES design and implementa-
tion. For instance, we regarded a payment ‘un-


































































for every unit enrolled – typically for every con-
tracted hectare, though sometimes per con-
tracted landowner. All other schemes we would 
by default consider ‘differentiated’ in our sim-
ple binary classification of payment diversifica-
tion.  
Similarly, some PES schemes preferen-
tially enrolled participants according to a pre-
analysis of whether the offered land area of-
fered potentially high ES gains (e.g. biodiver-
sity hotspots or carbon-rich forests), thus either 
constituting a spatial targeting of ES density 
(code=1) or not (code=0). Similarly, some PES 
implementers explicitly pre-classified potential 
participants according to the associated degree 
of threat/leverage (i.e. potential for change) 
they posed on ES delivery vis-à-vis a business-
as-usual baseline, e.g. by predicted deforesta-
tion risk (code=1), while others would abstain 
(code=0). Our spatial targeting classification 
thus distinguished three levels: a) no targeting, 
b) either ES density or threat targeted; and c) 
both density and threat targeted. 
Finally, enforced conditionality refers to the 
degree of combined sequential effort put into 
monitoring and sanctioning of noncompliance, 
respectively. We first classified whether PES 
implementers monitored land-use changes, ES 
changes, or both – and with what frequency. 
Second, we assessed if there was any history of 
enforcing sanctions (e.g. warnings, suspending 
payments, partially and/or temporarily, or per-
manently) when service providers had failed to 
comply, using three thresholds: a) sanctions 
never applied, b) infrequent or uncertain use, c) 
sanctions consistently applied. 
In some cases of incomplete information in 
the literature sources, we added our own collec-
tive field knowledge about the implementation 
aspects of specific cases; in a few others, we 
contacted key PES implementation stakehold-
ers for initiatives where persisting doubts 
needed clarification. 
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All data to support the findings of this study are 
being made available online in a Supplemen-
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Fig. 1. Payment diversification and PES de-
sign in public and private programmes 
worldwide. Public PES schemes dominate 
area-wise, except in Africa. Diversified pay-
ments have been more acceptable in OECD 
countries (Europe, North America, Australia), 
compared to Asia and South America. 
 
Fig. 2. ES focus, spatial targeting, and en-
forced conditionality of PES programmes. 
Watershed and biodiversity focused PES are 
more inclined to target high-density ES areas 
for enrolment than programmes focused on 
carbon and multiple ES. Yet, ES focus plays 
no role for explaining the differential degree of 
enforcing conditionality in PES programmes 
worldwide.  
 
